Why do stocks go up?

By Rohit Chauhan

In Uncategorized

November 27, 2011

6 Min read

26 comments

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This is an odd post to write when markets are dropping by the day. However I think that at times like these, it is important to remind ourselves of the basics so that one does not get overwhelmed by the negativity and fear around us.

So coming back to the question – Why do stocks go up? Well it depends on who you ask.

 If you ask a day trader, he or she is likely to say that it is due to volumes, the day’s news and finally due to sentiments. If you ask a technical analyst, the reason could range from the ordinary (volumes, patterns etc) to the esoteric (Elliot wave theory, Fibonacci sequence etc). If you ask the lay person, they would usually have no answer for it (as most consider the stock market to be nothing more than a casino).

As a long term investor, I prefer to ask the question in a different way. I am not concerned directly with the stock price, which merely reflects the business value over the long run. I am more concerned with what causes the business value to rise. If the intrinsic value of the business rises, the stock price is bound to follow sooner or later.

What is the difference?

If you agree with my argument that the key question to ask is what increases the intrinsic value, then the focus of analysis changes completely. One is no longer concerned with the market price (which will follow intrinsic value in time), but more concerned with the fundamentals of the business.

A focus on business value means that one is now concerned with the economics of the business, the competitive dynamics of the industry and finally the actions of the management.

The time horizon also changes from the short (price action) to the long term (business value). The reason for this change is also due to the fact that business value does not change much from day to day and usually takes anything from a few quarters to years to change.

What causes the business value to increase?

So let’s come back to the original question and restate it as – what causes the business value to increase?

Let me put a simple hypothesis – The value of a business usually increases if the management is able to invest, incremental capital at high rates of return.

Let me explain – Let’s say a company is earning around 15% on invested capital. If the management can re-invest the profits or borrowed money (incremental capital) at 20-25% on a sustained basis (say 5-8 yrs), intrinsic value is bound to increase and the stock price will follow in due course of time.

In the above example, if the management can re-invest at these high rates through new or existing businesses, then growth (which is what almost everyone is focused on) will follow automatically. Growth thus becomes a derivative of high rates of re-investment.

Examples of the value creators

Let try to understand the implication of the above hypothesis for various types of companies and see if it matches with reality.

Let’s look at the case of a few highly successful companies such as Hero Honda motors (10 yr CAGR = 34%) and HDFC (10 yr CAGR = 29.1%).

HDFC bank has maintained an average ROE in excess of 16% during the last 10 years and has grown its book value (which is a good proxy for intrinsic value) at the rate of 23% during the same period. The overall stock returns have followed this growth in book value, with a small delta coming through an increase in valuations (PE ratio).

The company has re-invested almost 75% of the profits (dividend payout is 25%) at high rates of return and thus increased the intrinsic value of the business

Hero Honda has an effective Return on capital of 100% or higher in its core business. It is very very difficult to re-invest all the profits back into the business at such high rates of return. The company has paid out a dividend of around 65% of its profits and re-invested the rest into the  business or held it as cash equivalents on its books.

Any business which can earn such stupendous rates of return on capital and re-invest even part of it at such high rates is likely to increase the intrinsic value of the business.

The value destroyers

The second group of companies are those which have a high return on capital, are not able to re-invest the profits at high returns but have chosen to retain this capital and invest it into low yielding deposits or mutual funds. These type of companies are actually destroying value as they are retaining the excess capital and ‘re-investing’ it at low rates.

The market clearly dislikes these type of companies and tends to give them a low valuation. An example which come to mind is a company  like Cheviot Company. These type of companies have above average rates of return in their core business, but choose to hold back majority of the profits on their balance sheet in low yielding deposits. These companies are value traps (in which yours truly has invested in the past)

The final group of companies are those which earn a low rate of return and tend to re- invest all the incremental capital at these low rates of return. This would include most of the commodity companies in sectors such as cement, steel, sugar  etc. These companies destroy value as they grow and hence never get decent valuations in the stock market. For example, pickup any sugar company and look at their  5 and 10 year returns. Investors have lost money over a 5 to 10 year period in these companies.

Does the hypothesis help in picking stocks?

The above proposition does not help one in picking the next multi-bagger. Although it is easy to see which company performed well in hindsight, returns come from being able to identify which company will do well in the future and then buy it at a reasonable price.

Inspite of this limitation, the above thought process helps one to avoid a certain set of companies. Not losing money is half the battle in the stock market.

If one has a 3-5 year time horizon, then it is important to avoid companies which are likely to destroy value by re-investing at low rates of return – in the core business or by just holding the cash.

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Applying models to real life

By Rohit Chauhan

In Uncategorized

November 16, 2011

5 Min read

9 comments

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As an armchair investor, I usually analyze companies and their economic models through their annual reports and other published documents. This is a top down approach and does not involve any grass roots analysis or any kind of investigation at the ground level. At the end of the day, it has a virtual feel to it.

I recently met a distant relative, who is in the transportation business – mainly long distance trucking and started talking with him about the economics of his business. He mentioned a few key points of his business

–          The pricing in the business is very volatile in nature. He was able to get good pricing (rate per tonne) during the 2004-2008 period. The rates collapsed during the 2008 -2009 period. Rates have recovered since then, but are still not anywhere near the peak levels.

–          The current rates are slightly above break even. He is able to make good profits in a few months, but ends up giving back (looses money) part of it in the other months.

–          He had contracted with large companies via fixed rate contracts and got killed by these contracts during the downturn due to low utilization (A truck under a fixed rate contract cannot be hired out). At present, he has inflation related pricing clauses, but is unable to enforce them due to severe competition.

–          The trucking business is driven by vehicle finance from banks and NBFCs. Large companies like TCI are able to negotiate rates and payment terms with them. However as a small operator, he is unable to do so.

–          The current ROC in the business is an anemic 10-13% of capital. At the same time there is a lot of stress. Due to these factors a lot of small operators are exiting the business and he is planning to do the same.

I started thinking about the economics of the business and did a mental exercise of applying the porter’s five factor model to the business to see how the facts fit the model

a.    Entry barriers: This business has low to nonexistent barriers to entry. A typical truck costs around 22-29 lacs (total cost) and one can easily get a loan of around 20 lacs. So anyone can enter this business with a starting capital of 7 lacs. In addition, one does not need any specialized skills in this business (beyond a driver’s license and a transport permit). Finally, there is an open market for trucking service (via brokers) and any operator can contract out his vehicle (if he accepts the offered price)

b.    Buyer power: Buyer power is quite high in this industry, especially with large companies. A large cement or steel companies drives a hard bargain with the transport operator as trucking, atleast at the small scale is a commodity product.

c.    Supplier power: Supplier power is quite high too. A small transport operator has to deal with large banks or NBFC for finance and with Tata motors or Ashok Leyland for the trucks. It is easy to see the lack of leverage in this unequal relationship. Fuel is the biggest variable cost, which also is priced by the government.

d.    Substitute product: Although there is not much substitution for road transport, multi-modal transport is now becoming a viable alternative. Large operators like GATI, concor or gateway distriparks now offer a combination of road and rail transport and thus provide a cheaper option. This has now started to hurt the smaller operators

e.    Competitive intensity: This is very high in the industry. As it is easy to add capacity (does not take much to buy trucks or divert it to a more profitable routes), pricing is driven by demand and supply. Due to the highly fragmented nature of the industry, most of the small operators are price takers and are not able to earn an attractive return on capital

It is also clear that the industry is now consolidating with the exit of the smaller players. In a commodity industry, the pricing is driven by the lowest cost operator. In the trucking industry the large operators (especially multi-modal transporters) have some leverage with the suppliers and are able to drive costs down (due to scale) and thus earn an attractive return on capital.

One added reason for doing this mental exercise is that I did a short project with Tata motors in their heavy vehicle business as a management student in the late 90s. The economics for the small operator had started deteriorating then and has now become worse due to the entry of multi-modal transport operators.

At the end of the conversation, I did not want to advise my relative that he should exit this business as it would seem presumptuous (what would an armchair investor know?). However, I am guessing that he has arrived at the same conclusion without using the fancy models and would be exiting it soon.

In the end, I think it was a good learning experience for me. The trucking business reminds me of the following quote by warren buffett

‘When a management team with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact’

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Learning from failure

By Rohit Chauhan

In Uncategorized

October 27, 2011

5 Min read

31 comments

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I often torture myself by looking at my past mistakes, every now and then. It may not be fun, but it is a very useful exercise

The idea of doing these exercises is not to beat myself up , but to identify patterns of incorrect thinking, and avoid repeating them in the future.

So why analyze mistakes

The human mind has a tendency to ascribe failure to bad luck and success to one’s own brilliance. In addition to this bias, there is also the problem of social disapproval. In school, did you ever get a pat on your back when you came back home with a bad report card?

In spite of all the disadvantages, I think there is substantial value in analyzing and learning from your own and other’s mistakes. The first and more difficult step is to acknowledge to yourself, that you goofed up.  A more fool hardy step, is to do it publicly like me and make a fool out of yourself J

A recent example

Let’s look at a recent example. I had posted about facor alloys recently. I wrote about it here, here and here.

The key points of the thesis were

–          The company had turned around its fundamentals and was now operating profitability. The balance sheet was sound with plenty of excess cash

–          The company would continue to do reasonably well if the industry economics did not collapse (i.e steel demand did not collapse)

–          Finally and one of the key reasons driving my purchase, was that the company appeared to very cheap.

As I said in the earlier posts, this was a small position with the intention of exploring the small/midcap space in the commodity sector. I was not able to convince myself to carry a big position (call it gut feel or whatever)

The transaction history

I wrote about the company around March 2010 and started buying around that time. I built a small position over the next few months at an average price of around 6.6 Rs per share. I sold around 30% of the position, when the price rose to around 8 / share and booked some profit (I usually never do that – which shows my conviction levels).

I read the annual report of facor alloys later in the year and posted the following

I was also disappointed after I read the annual report of facor alloys. The company has passed several special resolutions to invest to the tune of 300+ crs in other sister firms, which are expanding into power and other businesses. I get fairly mad with this kind of diversifications. Needless to say, I plan to exit the stock in time irrespective of what happens to the business or the stock.

As you can see, the above was posted in Nov 2010, but I finally exited the position in June 2011. Why did I wait? Good question! The answer is that I was slow to accept my own conclusions and was ‘hoping’ the position would work out. In the end, hope is a dangerous strategy in the stock market

Learnings

I lost around 12% on the position after including dividend. So what I learn from this expensive tuition?

–          Hope is a very bad strategy. If your original thesis turns out to incorrect, then exit the position. In this case, it turned out that the cash was never to going to come back to the investor. The management has their own plans, with which i am not comfortable. In such a situation, one cannot have the conviction to hold on to the stock.

–          Accepting mistakes is painful. At the same time, the earlier one does it, the better it is for the overall portfolio (there are opportunity costs involved)

–          The market rewards companies which are able to re-invest capital in their own business at high rates of return. If the company cannot do that, then the expectation is that the cash would be returned to the shareholders via dividend or buyback. If the management decides to diversify without appropriate transparency, the market is likely to take a dim view of it (read poor valuations)

–          Small and midcap commodity stocks are possibly good trading stocks. You buy at specific time of the commodity cycle and exit before just before the cycle turns. It is not a coincidence that companies like facor alloys are the most touted stocks on the various tip services. These kinds of stocks are a bad idea for me as I cannot play this game at all.

Why do this to yourself?

You may ask – why invest in such stocks in the first place. I personally think, it is not possible to become a good investor without committing a few mistakes along the way. The more important thing is to keep the mistakes small, acknowledge them quickly, close them out and finally learn from them. Easy to say, difficult to do

A side project

I am doing an analysis of stocks which have dropped by more than 50% in the last 5 yrs. The reason for this analysis is to understand the cause of failure and hopefully use the learnings to make better decisions. If you are aware of any such stocks, please leave it in the comments. I would greatly appreciate it.

By the way, in case you are wondering, I don’t always lose money on my stocks picks J. Quite a few do well too, but then what is the fun in boasting when every other guy is anyway doing that.

A happy diwali to all the readers. Hope all of you have a prosperous new year.

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A case of ignored liabilities

By Rohit Chauhan

In Industry analysis, Uncategorized

October 19, 2011

8 Min read

20 comments

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There is virtue in being patient, more so if you are a long term investor. I got a taste of this lesson again, recently with tata steel.

I had been analyzing tata steel for a few weeks and got extremely tempted when the stock hit 400 Rs a share. I would have pulled the trigger on this one, but decided to follow a time tested approach – Never buy a stock when you are in heat J

I usually spend a few weeks analyzing a stock. Once I have completed the first round of analysis, I leave it and try to come back to it after a few days or weeks. The advantage of this approach is that it allows me to sort of cool down and get a little more rational. It helps in reducing the adrenaline surge I get when I am looking at a good business, which also seems to be quite cheap.

The story behind tata steel

Tata steel is one of oldest steels companies in India. It has a capacity of around 6.8 MMT (million metric tons), mostly in Jamshedpur. In addition the company has a Brownfield project of around 3MMT at the same location, due in 2012 and another Greenfield project coming up in Orissa in around 2014.

Tata steel India is one of the most profitable steel companies in the world with operating margins in excess of 30%. Iron ore and coal accounts for almost 60% or more of the cost of production. Tata steel owns its own mines and thus has been shielded from the rise in the cost of iron ore and coal. In addition, it is also an operationally well managed company.

The Corus acquisition

Tata steel acquired Corus in 2007. You can read about it here.  Tata steel announced its intention to acquire Corus in 2006 and then got into a bidding war with CSN and eventually paid 12 billion dollars (around 55000 Crs) for the company.  You can read about Corus here.

Corus has three integrated steel plants in UK and Netherlands. In addition, the company also has multiple rolling mills and manufacturing locations across Europe. The company had around 50000 employees at the time of acquisition which has come down since then due to layoffs, restructuring and closure /sales of some facilities.

Tata steel invested around 3.7 billion (around 17500 Crs) in the form of equity and bridge loan. The rest was financed via an LBO (the acquired company took the debt on its balance sheet). So at the end of the transaction, tata steel at a consolidated level had a debt of around 54000 Crs against equity of 34000 Crs.

I am not as smart as the Tata steel managers or the banker who advised them, so I still cannot figure how this was a good deal for the shareholders. The Indian shareholder paid around 9 times EBDITA for the Corus. In addition, they used  the stock of tata steel to pay for it, which is a far more profitable company than Corus ( Tata steel India had an EBDITA of 511$/ tonne of steel where as tata steel Europe had an EBDITA of 122$/ tonne in Q12012).

Anyway, after the deal happened we had the financial crisis and the deal which appeared pricey to begin with, now looked like a complete disaster.

So what interested me ?

As I said earlier, the management of the company is very good from an operational standpoint (capital allocation is a different matter). The management has been energetic and proactive in tackling the problems in the European operations.

The high cost structure in Europe is being attacked by closing/ selling facilities. In addition there have been layoffs and work force reduction to improve the labor productivity. As a result of these ongoing improvements, the European operations is no longer losing money and has actually started making some money now. If Europe does not have a severe crisis due to Greece and other PIIGS countries (and it is a big if), then tata steel Europe should be reasonably profitable in the next few years

The management has also gone ahead and improved the capital structure by selling some non core assets such as shares in other tata group companies, interest in Riverdale mining etc. The net Debt to equity ratio is down to 1:1 in the current quarter and is likely to improve further. As a result the balance sheet is much stronger and can withstand a recession better than it could in 2008.

So what scares me?

As I said earlier in the post, the ongoing improvements in Europe and the new capacity in India (which will raise total capacity by 50% in the near future) got me all excited. I decided to cool it down and wait for a few days as I continued to dig further into the balance sheet .

I came across the following , for the post retirement pension plan (pg 218 of 2011 annual report). The numbers below are in crores.

Look at the above number and ponder on it for a minute.

Tata steel has a networth of around 35000 Cr last year and made a net profit of around 9000 Crores in 2011. The pension liability is 3 times the networth and 12 times the annual profit.

I cannot give a lesson on pension liability accounting in this post, but let me give a few points to think about.

The pension liabilities are covered by assets (think money set aside to pay for the pension) .In a happy situation as above, where the assets  exceed the liability, the company gets to carry a positive balance on its balance. If however the market weakens and the assets drop or do not earn the expected rate of return, then the difference is carried as a liability on the balance sheet.

As per Indian accounting, a company has to take this liability through its profit and loss and show a loss if required. However tata steel, very conveniently, decided to opt for UK accounting standards and carries the liability on its balance sheet alone. Now this is perfectly legal and there is no hanky panky in it.

In addition overtime, if this gap keeps growing, the company is required to cover the difference by charging the shortfall to the profits and by adding capital to the assets (set more money aside) . If you are thinking that the company can get away from it, think twice. This is a defined benefit plan – which means the workers have to be paid their pension, irrespective of the returns on the assets.

The liabilities are solid and will grow at a fixed rate. The growth in the assets depends on the returns on the stocks and bonds, which is anything but fixed. Finally this is Europe – you cannot  get away from such liabilities at all (short of bankruptcy)

Where’s the risk

The assets under the pension plan cover the liabilities for now.  However the gap is less than 2% now. How can we be sure that that the assumed returns on the asset (4.25-9.25%) will not turn out to be optimistic ? If that happens, then tata steel has a huge bill to foot in the coming years.

I am personally quite uncomfortable with this kind of an open ended liability. It is difficult even for the management to predict what will happen as it depends on the returns they will get on the assets (stocks and bonds) in the future. If there is a shortfall, the picture could get very ugly for the shareholders

So why is no one talking about it?

I think I know the reason for this. This is a long term, contingent liability. The shortfall may or may never happen. If you are an analyst, recommending the stock for the next 3-6 months, this kind of liability does not matter. If something does happen, you can always say – oops J

If however, you are a long term investor like me, such liabilities can make a big difference, especially if you cannot evaluate it with confidence. I have not given up completely on this – I have uploaded a sum of the parts valuation for tata steel here (pls have a look and leave me any feedback you may have)

Controlling my testosterone

As I said in my previous post, one of the key points for me as an investor is to manage my emotions and first conclusion bias. I generally try to stagger my analysis and purchase so that I can avoid the first conclusion bias and then the commitment and consistency bias, which kicks in after the first purchase.

In the above case, I have found a liability which may turn out to be immaterial eventually. At the same time, even if the probalitlity is low, the downside is very high if it is does materialize. This liability is in addition to the 40000 cr debt already held on the balance sheet and  weak European operations .  All these liabilities are supported by the highly profitable Indian operations. Lets hope they stay strong !

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