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Analysis : Noida toll bridge

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I typically have a look at my current positions every 6-12 months independent of the quarterly/ annual results. This allows me to evaluate the company independent of the recent results (which would bias my thinking)

About
The Noida Toll Bridge Company Limited was incorporated as a Special Purpose Vehicle for the Delhi Noida Bridge Project on a Build, Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT) basis. The Delhi Noida Bridge is an eight lane tolled facility across the Yamuna river, connecting Noida to South Delhi.

The company initially had financial issues after the toll bridge was completed as the initial traffic projections did not materialize. The company had a highly leveraged structure (high debt) and hence had to get the debt re-structured. In addition the company also raised equity in 2006 to improve the debt equity ratio.

The company has since then paid off substantial amount of its debt and has a low debt to equity ratio of 0.3:1.

Business model
The business model of toll bridge is quite interesting to say the least. The initial capital investment is fairly high in an infrastructure project. Once this capital is invested, the ongoing maintenance and operational costs are very low and most of the incremental revenue flows to the profit.

However if the initial revenue projections do not materialize, then the debt load can crush a company, which occurred in case of noida toll bridge, due to which the company had to undergo the re-structuring. The company was thus able to buy time for the traffic projections to come through. The toll bridge now handles around 105000 vehicles per day (ADT or average daily traffic) which is around 45% of the rated capacity.

Current financials
The company had a toll revenue of around 71 Crs in 2010. The company is also able to sell rights for outdoor advertising around the bridge and was able to earn around 8 Crs from it. There is some miscellaneous income of around 5-6 Crs in addition to the above.

The company was able to make a net profit of around 28 Crs on the above revenue base. The company has an operating expense of around 30% of which the main heads are staff costs (salary) at around 8%, depreciation at around 6% and O&M (operating and maintenance) costs at around 8.6%.

The depreciation expenses are bound to remain fixed as there is not much addition to the fixed assets. A portion of the O&M expenses are now paid as a fixed charge to a 51% subsidiary and are not based on the traffic volumes. The salary costs and some other expenses such as legal fees, travelling expense etc are variable and are bound to increase over time.

The company thus has around 40-45 Crs of pretax profits available to service the debt. The company has been paying down debt which now stands at around 145 Crs in the latest quarter. At the current profit levels, the company should be able to payoff its entire debt in less than 3 years (though it may not happen due some of the re-structuring clauses).

The valuation model
Noida toll bridge may be one of the easier companies to model to arrive at a fair value. The average daily traffic (ADT) has grown at around 15% in the past. One cannot assume that the traffic will continue to grow at that pace, however one can easily assume that the traffic will atleast grow at 3-5% annum till we reach the 100% capacity of the toll bridge.

The average fare per vehicle is around 19 Rs. One can assume atleast a 5% increase in the fare over time (slightly less than inflation). These two figures – ADR and average fare can be used to estimate the toll revenue.

The current operating costs are a mix of fixed (depreciation) and variable (staff and other costs) expenses. On an optimistic note, one may assume that these expenses may go down as percentage of revenue. However if one, wants to be conservative, then the expenses can be assumed to be around 30-35% of the revenue.

There are two additional factors to consider in the valuation. The first factor is the advertising revenue which the company can earn with minimal expenses. In addition to this, the company also has a leasehold title to around 99 acres of land which was awarded by the government as compensation for shortfall in the revenue. The company estimates this title to have a value of around 300 Crs. I have personally not ascribed full value to it as I don’t have an idea on the status of this leasehold title or what the company plans to do with it (which the company describes as a risk)

The risks
Noida toll bridge was assured a 20% return on the cost of the toll bridge through toll collection and development rights for 30 years. In the initial years, the traffic projections did not come through and hence the actual returns were much lesser than the assured returns. The shortfall in the returns has been accruing to the company and one way of compensating the company would be to extend the 30 year operation period for the company. In other words, the company may be allowed to run the toll bridge for a much longer period.

The leasehold title is definitely a risk for the company. Anything related to land always has some kind of political risks.

One irritant for me is the staff cost. The staff cost for the company is way too high. The company has around 15 employees and wage bill of almost 6 Crs. The key management personnel (CEO and a manager) are paid a salary of around 4Crs. I think the compensation costs of the company are high.

Finally, the company will generate quite a bit of cash flow once the debt is paid off. It is not clear what the company intends to do with the excess cash, though the company has started paying dividend in the current year

Conclusion
My own valuation estimate is around 50-55 Rs per share with an assumption in traffic growth of 5% and fare rate increase of around 3-5% per annum. You have two options – either take my estimate on face value, or you can use the assumptions I have provided to estimate the value on your own.

My personal preference is to consider a range of assumptions for traffic growth, fare rate changes and cost parameters to arrive at a range of fair value.

Noida toll bridge has a much higher probability of increasing revenue, though anything can happen to prevent it (such as people will start walking instead of driving). On the flip side, there is a limit to the growth and upside as the maximum capacity of the toll bridge is fixed and once that is reached, further increases will be limited to fare increases only.

At current prices, I am not buyer of the stock as it is not very attractive yet. I have small position in the company. As always please read the disclaimer before making a decision to buy or sell the stock.

Annual portfolio review – 2010

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It’s the time of the year when everyone looks at the year gone by and makes resolutions for the new year. My resolution for the new year? run a 5K marathon 🙂. Anyway, I digress. This blog is not about my attempts to get fit.

I did an annual portfolio review in 2009 here. I think the returns in 2009 were out of the ordinary as the stock markets were recovering from a huge shock. I did not expect the 2010 returns to be any close to it. That prediction turned out to be true.

How I evaluate performance

The most typical approach to evaluate performance is to look at the annual return and if it has met your expectations (which vary from individual to individual), then one can declare victory and move on. As you might suspect I don’t stop at that.

Annual returns are important, but not the sole indicator of performance. A year’s return is driven more by luck than skill. A few lucky picks can give a big boost to your portfolio and a few bad ones can ruin the year. One has to distinguish skill from luck. I look at the portfolio performance for the last 2-3 years and compare it with my objective – which is to beat the index by 5-8% per annum.

Now, there is no audit of my performance, so I can claim whatever I want – no one can verify it. So instead of trying to quote a number, let me state that I have achieved my goals by a wide margin in 2010 and for a 3 year period too

Is 5-8% outperformance not for the wimps?

Now some of you who would have dabbled in small, micro or no cap stocks may be thinking – what a sissy 🙂 . I can do far far better than this dude

My response – that’s absolutely true. My personal goal is not to achieve the highest possible return. My goal is to achieve decent returns at moderate to low risk. My own portfolio has around 15-20 stocks, with no stock more than 5% of the portfolio. I have structured my portfolio to achieve a decent level of outperformance, but ensure that a single bad idea will not ruin my networth.

Think of it this way – A 5-8% outperformance will give me a 19-22% annual return. That means 5-7 times my original capital in 10 years. If I achieve this I will be very pleased with my performance.

Additional parameters of evaluation

I have another parameter which I use to evaluate the attractiveness of my portfolio – let’s call it the ‘discount to fair value for the portfolio’. Let me explain

Let’s say I have two stocks in the portfolio (1 share each)

Stock A – fair value is 100, current price is – 60

Stock B – fair value is 100, current price is – 70

So for total portfolio (A+B) – fair value is 200, sum invested is 130.

The ‘discount to fair value of the portfolio’ is 35% (200-130/200). I generally focus on this number quite closely. This is a very useful number to make buy/ sell decisions and structure the portfolio (more on it in another post)

I am listing the actual discount below for a few years (end of year)

2008- 60%

2009 – 26%

2010 – 36%

The numbers are quite instructive. In 2008, as the market crashed I added stocks to my portfolio and saw this number rise. In 2009 as the stock prices rose, this number reduced (as the portfolio gained in value).

So in 2010, how did this number increase?

Quite simply, I reduced my fully valued positions and kept adding to the undervalued position. Although this is not a magic number, I have seen that if I have done my homework well then a large discount has typically led to a good performance over time.

My overall objective is to keep this number between 30-40% or more.

Specific performance

Let’s get from the abstract to the concrete (hopefully I have not lost you !)

The big winners for me were – Gujarat gas, Merck (finally !), LMW, grindwell Norton (which had not done well last year), Honda siel (surprise), Cheviot (some movement !) , Ashok Leyland etc. I have constantly been selling some of these stocks.

I have added some new positions, some of which are listed here.

I sold off these position or reduced these stocks substantially – NIIT tech, Patni, Infosys, Sulzer, ESAB india, Concor, Denso, VST and Ingersoll rand.

Ofcourse not everything was a winner – VST for one was a very average pick.

The new areas in 2010

I have started exploring several new areas – more from a learning standpoint. I have been experimenting on options and arbitrage.

Options have been a mixed bag and I plan to pursue it more as an insurance than to make money off it. I plan to focus more on arbitrage in the future as it is an interesting field and works well my investment approach.

Plans for 2011

I have no grand strategy for 2011. No hot sectors, must have stocks for next year. The strategy is going to be the same – keep looking for good and cheap stocks the old fashioned way – read and analyse.

Arbitrage – Kesar enterprise

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Now, before I start crowing, let me come clean on a few points. The Kesar enterprise arbitrage idea was brought to me by ninad (see his blog here). I was smart enough to get on the ride.

This deal was announced in March and it took around 9 months for the deal to complete. I have also listed some thoughts and analysis (which include substantial inputs from ninad) over the course of the deal at various points of time

Basic idea
Kesar enterprise is a sugar company with a division which was expanding into the warehousing and other port related infrastructure such as storage. The company announced in Dec 2009 that they would be demerging the infrastructure business. You can find the announcement here.

I am posting my personal notes on the deal below

De-merger evaluation – March 19th
Kesar enterprises has announced the de-merger of its Sugar biz from the Infrastructure warehousing biz.

The numbers for each biz is as follows (in crs)

Warehouse/ transport divison
Revenue: 16 Crs (2010 expected)
PAT: 7-8 crs
Return on assets – 30%+
Valuation – around 60-70 crs minimum

Sugar divison
Revenue – 285 crs gross including excise
PAT – 2-3 crs.
Over 10 years the company has made very small profits. So difficult to value based on profits.

Inverting the problem – Mcap of the company is 82 crs. So is the sugar biz atleast 20-30 crs?

Alternative valuations
Book value – 40-50 crs (after all debt). So liquidation value is higher

Comparative valuation – based on price / sales, most of companies in this sector are priced around 1-2 times. Due to poor profitability, we can price this company at 50% of sales – 100 crs?

On capacity basis, a comparable company like dhampur sugar (UP based company), sells for 0.011 Crs/ TCD. Kesar enterprise sugar business can then be valued at 80 crs.

So total conservative value is around 140-200 crs.

Action plan – create initial position at 120 levels

Negative case – March 30th
Sugar prices tumbling and market has caused the stock prices to drop by 30% in feb and march. Kesar has seen stock price drop by 10-15%.
2011 will see surplus sugar and hence the futures have started going down. Stock prices could drop
further – if that is the case, delay increasing the position, close to the ex-date as possible

Debt getting split – more to infra company: need to track this
Midcap discount – look at midcap futures to hedge?
How to hedge against drop in sugar industry – can use puts on Balrampur chini and Bajaj Hindustan

Stock goes ex-date – May 19th
The ex-date was 14-May. The sugar business has dropped to around 50 rs which gives a mcap of 30 crs. The sugar biz is in down cycle and hence the prices for all companies have crashed
Key mistake and learning – did not hedge on the down turn in sugar as I was thinking on 30-march.

Action plan – wait for upturn in sugar to exit the sugar biz. A sale at 60 and higher should work out in the deal. May have to sustain further drops before recovery.

Kesar enterprise stock recovers – Sept first week
Price now at 70 levels. Sell the stock!!

Kesar infrastructure yet to be listed – Dec first week
Was able to sell the sugar piece @65-70 prices. Deal which was expected to take 4-5 months at max has taken twice that amount – around 9 months already. No updates yet.

Stock finally listed – Dec 22nd
Kesar infrastructure finally listed at 99. A gain of 30% in nine months. May hold on to the stock

Key learnings
· Such arbitrage deals take longer than expected. Patience is the key here
· One cannot ignore short term implications on the stock price and treat it as a long term idea. If possible, options can be used to hedge the position only if the timelines are certain
· Build the arbitrage position over a period of time and not immediately after the announcement as the price drifts downwards once the buying/ selling pressure subsides

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