Applying models to real life

By Rohit Chauhan

In Uncategorized

November 16, 2011

5 Min read

9 comments

A

As an armchair investor, I usually analyze companies and their economic models through their annual reports and other published documents. This is a top down approach and does not involve any grass roots analysis or any kind of investigation at the ground level. At the end of the day, it has a virtual feel to it.

I recently met a distant relative, who is in the transportation business – mainly long distance trucking and started talking with him about the economics of his business. He mentioned a few key points of his business

–          The pricing in the business is very volatile in nature. He was able to get good pricing (rate per tonne) during the 2004-2008 period. The rates collapsed during the 2008 -2009 period. Rates have recovered since then, but are still not anywhere near the peak levels.

–          The current rates are slightly above break even. He is able to make good profits in a few months, but ends up giving back (looses money) part of it in the other months.

–          He had contracted with large companies via fixed rate contracts and got killed by these contracts during the downturn due to low utilization (A truck under a fixed rate contract cannot be hired out). At present, he has inflation related pricing clauses, but is unable to enforce them due to severe competition.

–          The trucking business is driven by vehicle finance from banks and NBFCs. Large companies like TCI are able to negotiate rates and payment terms with them. However as a small operator, he is unable to do so.

–          The current ROC in the business is an anemic 10-13% of capital. At the same time there is a lot of stress. Due to these factors a lot of small operators are exiting the business and he is planning to do the same.

I started thinking about the economics of the business and did a mental exercise of applying the porter’s five factor model to the business to see how the facts fit the model

a.    Entry barriers: This business has low to nonexistent barriers to entry. A typical truck costs around 22-29 lacs (total cost) and one can easily get a loan of around 20 lacs. So anyone can enter this business with a starting capital of 7 lacs. In addition, one does not need any specialized skills in this business (beyond a driver’s license and a transport permit). Finally, there is an open market for trucking service (via brokers) and any operator can contract out his vehicle (if he accepts the offered price)

b.    Buyer power: Buyer power is quite high in this industry, especially with large companies. A large cement or steel companies drives a hard bargain with the transport operator as trucking, atleast at the small scale is a commodity product.

c.    Supplier power: Supplier power is quite high too. A small transport operator has to deal with large banks or NBFC for finance and with Tata motors or Ashok Leyland for the trucks. It is easy to see the lack of leverage in this unequal relationship. Fuel is the biggest variable cost, which also is priced by the government.

d.    Substitute product: Although there is not much substitution for road transport, multi-modal transport is now becoming a viable alternative. Large operators like GATI, concor or gateway distriparks now offer a combination of road and rail transport and thus provide a cheaper option. This has now started to hurt the smaller operators

e.    Competitive intensity: This is very high in the industry. As it is easy to add capacity (does not take much to buy trucks or divert it to a more profitable routes), pricing is driven by demand and supply. Due to the highly fragmented nature of the industry, most of the small operators are price takers and are not able to earn an attractive return on capital

It is also clear that the industry is now consolidating with the exit of the smaller players. In a commodity industry, the pricing is driven by the lowest cost operator. In the trucking industry the large operators (especially multi-modal transporters) have some leverage with the suppliers and are able to drive costs down (due to scale) and thus earn an attractive return on capital.

One added reason for doing this mental exercise is that I did a short project with Tata motors in their heavy vehicle business as a management student in the late 90s. The economics for the small operator had started deteriorating then and has now become worse due to the entry of multi-modal transport operators.

At the end of the conversation, I did not want to advise my relative that he should exit this business as it would seem presumptuous (what would an armchair investor know?). However, I am guessing that he has arrived at the same conclusion without using the fancy models and would be exiting it soon.

In the end, I think it was a good learning experience for me. The trucking business reminds me of the following quote by warren buffett

‘When a management team with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact’

Read on9 comments

Learning from failure

By Rohit Chauhan

In Uncategorized

October 27, 2011

5 Min read

31 comments

L

I often torture myself by looking at my past mistakes, every now and then. It may not be fun, but it is a very useful exercise

The idea of doing these exercises is not to beat myself up , but to identify patterns of incorrect thinking, and avoid repeating them in the future.

So why analyze mistakes

The human mind has a tendency to ascribe failure to bad luck and success to one’s own brilliance. In addition to this bias, there is also the problem of social disapproval. In school, did you ever get a pat on your back when you came back home with a bad report card?

In spite of all the disadvantages, I think there is substantial value in analyzing and learning from your own and other’s mistakes. The first and more difficult step is to acknowledge to yourself, that you goofed up.  A more fool hardy step, is to do it publicly like me and make a fool out of yourself J

A recent example

Let’s look at a recent example. I had posted about facor alloys recently. I wrote about it here, here and here.

The key points of the thesis were

–          The company had turned around its fundamentals and was now operating profitability. The balance sheet was sound with plenty of excess cash

–          The company would continue to do reasonably well if the industry economics did not collapse (i.e steel demand did not collapse)

–          Finally and one of the key reasons driving my purchase, was that the company appeared to very cheap.

As I said in the earlier posts, this was a small position with the intention of exploring the small/midcap space in the commodity sector. I was not able to convince myself to carry a big position (call it gut feel or whatever)

The transaction history

I wrote about the company around March 2010 and started buying around that time. I built a small position over the next few months at an average price of around 6.6 Rs per share. I sold around 30% of the position, when the price rose to around 8 / share and booked some profit (I usually never do that – which shows my conviction levels).

I read the annual report of facor alloys later in the year and posted the following

I was also disappointed after I read the annual report of facor alloys. The company has passed several special resolutions to invest to the tune of 300+ crs in other sister firms, which are expanding into power and other businesses. I get fairly mad with this kind of diversifications. Needless to say, I plan to exit the stock in time irrespective of what happens to the business or the stock.

As you can see, the above was posted in Nov 2010, but I finally exited the position in June 2011. Why did I wait? Good question! The answer is that I was slow to accept my own conclusions and was ‘hoping’ the position would work out. In the end, hope is a dangerous strategy in the stock market

Learnings

I lost around 12% on the position after including dividend. So what I learn from this expensive tuition?

–          Hope is a very bad strategy. If your original thesis turns out to incorrect, then exit the position. In this case, it turned out that the cash was never to going to come back to the investor. The management has their own plans, with which i am not comfortable. In such a situation, one cannot have the conviction to hold on to the stock.

–          Accepting mistakes is painful. At the same time, the earlier one does it, the better it is for the overall portfolio (there are opportunity costs involved)

–          The market rewards companies which are able to re-invest capital in their own business at high rates of return. If the company cannot do that, then the expectation is that the cash would be returned to the shareholders via dividend or buyback. If the management decides to diversify without appropriate transparency, the market is likely to take a dim view of it (read poor valuations)

–          Small and midcap commodity stocks are possibly good trading stocks. You buy at specific time of the commodity cycle and exit before just before the cycle turns. It is not a coincidence that companies like facor alloys are the most touted stocks on the various tip services. These kinds of stocks are a bad idea for me as I cannot play this game at all.

Why do this to yourself?

You may ask – why invest in such stocks in the first place. I personally think, it is not possible to become a good investor without committing a few mistakes along the way. The more important thing is to keep the mistakes small, acknowledge them quickly, close them out and finally learn from them. Easy to say, difficult to do

A side project

I am doing an analysis of stocks which have dropped by more than 50% in the last 5 yrs. The reason for this analysis is to understand the cause of failure and hopefully use the learnings to make better decisions. If you are aware of any such stocks, please leave it in the comments. I would greatly appreciate it.

By the way, in case you are wondering, I don’t always lose money on my stocks picks J. Quite a few do well too, but then what is the fun in boasting when every other guy is anyway doing that.

A happy diwali to all the readers. Hope all of you have a prosperous new year.

Read on31 comments

A case of ignored liabilities

By Rohit Chauhan

In Industry analysis, Uncategorized

October 19, 2011

8 Min read

20 comments

A

There is virtue in being patient, more so if you are a long term investor. I got a taste of this lesson again, recently with tata steel.

I had been analyzing tata steel for a few weeks and got extremely tempted when the stock hit 400 Rs a share. I would have pulled the trigger on this one, but decided to follow a time tested approach – Never buy a stock when you are in heat J

I usually spend a few weeks analyzing a stock. Once I have completed the first round of analysis, I leave it and try to come back to it after a few days or weeks. The advantage of this approach is that it allows me to sort of cool down and get a little more rational. It helps in reducing the adrenaline surge I get when I am looking at a good business, which also seems to be quite cheap.

The story behind tata steel

Tata steel is one of oldest steels companies in India. It has a capacity of around 6.8 MMT (million metric tons), mostly in Jamshedpur. In addition the company has a Brownfield project of around 3MMT at the same location, due in 2012 and another Greenfield project coming up in Orissa in around 2014.

Tata steel India is one of the most profitable steel companies in the world with operating margins in excess of 30%. Iron ore and coal accounts for almost 60% or more of the cost of production. Tata steel owns its own mines and thus has been shielded from the rise in the cost of iron ore and coal. In addition, it is also an operationally well managed company.

The Corus acquisition

Tata steel acquired Corus in 2007. You can read about it here.  Tata steel announced its intention to acquire Corus in 2006 and then got into a bidding war with CSN and eventually paid 12 billion dollars (around 55000 Crs) for the company.  You can read about Corus here.

Corus has three integrated steel plants in UK and Netherlands. In addition, the company also has multiple rolling mills and manufacturing locations across Europe. The company had around 50000 employees at the time of acquisition which has come down since then due to layoffs, restructuring and closure /sales of some facilities.

Tata steel invested around 3.7 billion (around 17500 Crs) in the form of equity and bridge loan. The rest was financed via an LBO (the acquired company took the debt on its balance sheet). So at the end of the transaction, tata steel at a consolidated level had a debt of around 54000 Crs against equity of 34000 Crs.

I am not as smart as the Tata steel managers or the banker who advised them, so I still cannot figure how this was a good deal for the shareholders. The Indian shareholder paid around 9 times EBDITA for the Corus. In addition, they used  the stock of tata steel to pay for it, which is a far more profitable company than Corus ( Tata steel India had an EBDITA of 511$/ tonne of steel where as tata steel Europe had an EBDITA of 122$/ tonne in Q12012).

Anyway, after the deal happened we had the financial crisis and the deal which appeared pricey to begin with, now looked like a complete disaster.

So what interested me ?

As I said earlier, the management of the company is very good from an operational standpoint (capital allocation is a different matter). The management has been energetic and proactive in tackling the problems in the European operations.

The high cost structure in Europe is being attacked by closing/ selling facilities. In addition there have been layoffs and work force reduction to improve the labor productivity. As a result of these ongoing improvements, the European operations is no longer losing money and has actually started making some money now. If Europe does not have a severe crisis due to Greece and other PIIGS countries (and it is a big if), then tata steel Europe should be reasonably profitable in the next few years

The management has also gone ahead and improved the capital structure by selling some non core assets such as shares in other tata group companies, interest in Riverdale mining etc. The net Debt to equity ratio is down to 1:1 in the current quarter and is likely to improve further. As a result the balance sheet is much stronger and can withstand a recession better than it could in 2008.

So what scares me?

As I said earlier in the post, the ongoing improvements in Europe and the new capacity in India (which will raise total capacity by 50% in the near future) got me all excited. I decided to cool it down and wait for a few days as I continued to dig further into the balance sheet .

I came across the following , for the post retirement pension plan (pg 218 of 2011 annual report). The numbers below are in crores.

Look at the above number and ponder on it for a minute.

Tata steel has a networth of around 35000 Cr last year and made a net profit of around 9000 Crores in 2011. The pension liability is 3 times the networth and 12 times the annual profit.

I cannot give a lesson on pension liability accounting in this post, but let me give a few points to think about.

The pension liabilities are covered by assets (think money set aside to pay for the pension) .In a happy situation as above, where the assets  exceed the liability, the company gets to carry a positive balance on its balance. If however the market weakens and the assets drop or do not earn the expected rate of return, then the difference is carried as a liability on the balance sheet.

As per Indian accounting, a company has to take this liability through its profit and loss and show a loss if required. However tata steel, very conveniently, decided to opt for UK accounting standards and carries the liability on its balance sheet alone. Now this is perfectly legal and there is no hanky panky in it.

In addition overtime, if this gap keeps growing, the company is required to cover the difference by charging the shortfall to the profits and by adding capital to the assets (set more money aside) . If you are thinking that the company can get away from it, think twice. This is a defined benefit plan – which means the workers have to be paid their pension, irrespective of the returns on the assets.

The liabilities are solid and will grow at a fixed rate. The growth in the assets depends on the returns on the stocks and bonds, which is anything but fixed. Finally this is Europe – you cannot  get away from such liabilities at all (short of bankruptcy)

Where’s the risk

The assets under the pension plan cover the liabilities for now.  However the gap is less than 2% now. How can we be sure that that the assumed returns on the asset (4.25-9.25%) will not turn out to be optimistic ? If that happens, then tata steel has a huge bill to foot in the coming years.

I am personally quite uncomfortable with this kind of an open ended liability. It is difficult even for the management to predict what will happen as it depends on the returns they will get on the assets (stocks and bonds) in the future. If there is a shortfall, the picture could get very ugly for the shareholders

So why is no one talking about it?

I think I know the reason for this. This is a long term, contingent liability. The shortfall may or may never happen. If you are an analyst, recommending the stock for the next 3-6 months, this kind of liability does not matter. If something does happen, you can always say – oops J

If however, you are a long term investor like me, such liabilities can make a big difference, especially if you cannot evaluate it with confidence. I have not given up completely on this – I have uploaded a sum of the parts valuation for tata steel here (pls have a look and leave me any feedback you may have)

Controlling my testosterone

As I said in my previous post, one of the key points for me as an investor is to manage my emotions and first conclusion bias. I generally try to stagger my analysis and purchase so that I can avoid the first conclusion bias and then the commitment and consistency bias, which kicks in after the first purchase.

In the above case, I have found a liability which may turn out to be immaterial eventually. At the same time, even if the probalitlity is low, the downside is very high if it is does materialize. This liability is in addition to the 40000 cr debt already held on the balance sheet and  weak European operations .  All these liabilities are supported by the highly profitable Indian operations. Lets hope they stay strong !

Read on20 comments

Stock for the long run

By Rohit Chauhan

In Uncategorized

October 10, 2011

5 Min read

13 comments

S

I am married to some stocks, which in these times of hyperactive trading, is quite shocking to a lot of people.

I have held some of these stocks for five to ten years. I have discussed most these companies on my blog in the past. A partial list follows

1. Balmer lawrie – Held since early 2005: compounded return of around 26% per annum including dividends. You can read the analysis here, here and here
2. Asian paints – Held since 2001: Compounded return around 31% per annum including dividends. You can read the analysis here and here
3. Gujarat gas – Held since early 2005: Compounded return of around 38% per annum including dividends. You can read the analysis here and here
4. Crisil – Held since late 2008: Compounded return of around 42% per annum including dividends.  You can read the analysis here and here
5. Lakshmi machine works – Held since late 2008: Compounded return of around 50% per annum including dividends. You can read the analysis here and here.

Buy and hold philosophy?

The most common reaction to such an approach is to call it the buy and hold philosophy. I personally don’t follow any dogma in investing. At the time of investing in any stock, my approach is to buy stock in a company which has a sustainable competitive advantage (ability to maintain above average return on capital over a long period) and at a discount to fair value. I will hold the stock as long as the company continues to do well (maintains its competitive advantage) and is not too overpriced.

As you would notice in my approach above, there are no quantitative measures. Competitive advantage, though a well defined concept, is fuzzy in practice and not clear cut always. In addition, though some analysts like to give a specific number for fair value, it is usually an approximate number. As a result overvaluation also depends on your specific point of view (what you think about the company’s future prospects).

Due to the above subjectivity, I do not have a specific holding period in mind when I take a position in a stock. I generally evaluate the performance of the company annually, update the fair value and will hold till the market price does not exceed this fair value by 20-30%.

The above approach has led to a holding period of 5-10 yrs in case of some stocks.

Do I ever sell?

I will not hold the stock of a company, no matter how I feel about it, if I think the stock is overpriced. For example, I have reduced my position in asian paints in the last 2 years as the stock became overpriced.

I have exited Gujarat gas in the past when I thought it was overpriced and re-entered the stock when I felt it was undervalued again.

So in way, it is truly not a marriage, but more of a long term steady relationship 🙂

Why do most investors hold for shorter periods?

I have a theory or hypothesis on this. There is some research to support this theory too. Let me call this the ‘macho effect’. Most men, me included, want to look macho or ‘manly’ in almost all the activities they do. This testorone display is useful in a lot of activities (though one can doubt that too), but it is completely disastrous as far as investing is concerned.

What is the macho effect?  Simply put, most men think that they are highly skilled in investing and the way to show it off is to aim for the highest possible returns.  Any returns less than 40% per annum is for sissies. So in order to get these super high returns, they trade in and out of stocks and in the end are not even able to match market returns. The means becomes more important than the end itself.

If you don’t agree with my hypothesis, try discussing about a stock which can give you 20% per annum for the next 5 years with a high probability. Most of the guys will dismiss such a stock as useless and point to you a hot idea which can double in 3 months.

The same research (Barber and Odean (2000) study), also points out that women are much better investors than men. I think that would be true if they were more involved in the financial decisions of the family.

What are the downsides of long term holdings?

One downside is that such ideas will not make you look smart in front of your friends. These ideas will also not satisfy that ‘macho’ urge in you 🙂. If you really have that itch to scratch, keep around 10% of your portfolio for entertainment.

In addition, it is not always possible to know such ideas in advance. Some stocks develop into long term holdings as the company in question continues to perform well and as a result there is no reason to sell the stock. One can only look for good quality companies and hope that they will continue to perform well into the future.

How should one buy?

In times of market distress, several high quality companies are available at cheap valuation. One can look at creating a position in these stocks at such times. The advantage of buying the stock on the cheap is that one gets a double kicker – one from the reversion of the valuations to more normalized levels and the other from a steady increase in fair value of the stock.

I am quite comfortable with stocks listed in the post. In addition, I will add to them if the market continues to drop and they get cheaper.There are no guarantees that each of these companies will continue to do well, but as a group I would expect them to do well. Of course one has to be careful about the valuations at which you buy any stock.

Read on13 comments