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A relook at Indraprastha gas

A

I received an analyst report on Indraprastha gas (see here) from uresh patel yesterday. The report has a sell rating.

Normally once one has made a decision and proclaimed it in public (via a post in my case), it is diffcult to accept information which goes against your conclusion. With that in mind, I have been trying to look at the report as objectively as possible and see if it refutes my assumptions.

On a broad basis the following points are made by the analyst for the sell recommendation

1. IGL has substantial margin risk as it is supplied gas on a subsidised basis. However the subsidized gas is 40% of the total supply. I have taken this scenario into account in my valuation and worked out the DCF calculations with the operating margins dropping from 40% to 32% by 2010 and net margins dropping to 14 %. Gujarat gas which is a similar company has net margins of around 11%, has a much larger commerical customer base and hence taking Gujarat gas a base case, I have assumed IGL will have a slightly better pricing power. So I agree with the analyst on the margin risk and impact on the net margins.

2. The analyst highlight risk to the topline due to competiton. I could not find any specific competitors who are planning to enter the delhi market. I could be wrong on that. In addition, IGL is planning to expand into noida and gurgaon. They are also exploring markets in haryana. These plans are very crucial for the company. If the company were sit tight and do nothing in terms of growth, then the topline will stagnate or even decline in face of competition. I find that hard to believe in case of IGL which has clearly stated aggressive plans in the PNG segment and new markets. In addition they have the cash to do so. So I am not sure why IGL will not have topline growth or choose not to do so. However any growth

3. Margin risks due to diesel pricing – The analyst have analysed the margin risk due to diesel prices falling from here. I have no opinion on this factor as I cannot predict what will happen to petroleum prices. This is a wild card and could hurt margins for some time. As a result I see this as a risk, but cannot evaluate it and predict it. In addition, the analyst case is based on the scenario that oil prices will drop in the future and hence that would reduce the discount and hurt margins. I am sure if anyone can predict that.

4. Regulatory risk – I missed this out completely. On reading the report, i think this could be a key risk going forward. One has to look at the petroleum sector and now cement to get a feel of it.

I think the key difference between my analysis and the one in this report is the difference in the expected topline growth. I have assumed a topline growth of greater than 10% due to the new initiatives. The analyst has assumed less than 10%. As a result my intrinsic value estimates are closer to 150-160. However if the growth comes lesser than 10%, then instrinsic value drops to 100-110. This is without even considering the regulatory risk. Any adverse development on that front could cut down the intrinsic value further

I would be analysing my assumptions further and would take a decision based on that.

Increasing the circle of competence

I

The ‘circle of competence’ is a term coined by warren buffett. It roughly means companies, industries or businesses one knows well and can understand in depth to be able to analyse and predict the economics of the business for the next ten odd years.

In order to improve and increase the depth of my circle of competence, I have developed a business analysis worksheet which I have posted here again in the ‘My analysis worksheets’ section of the sidebar.

This worksheet is still work in progress. I would be uploading updated versions of it in the future.

Please feel free to download the worksheet, review and critique it, and send me any feedback on it. Please send me an email on valueinvestorindia@googlegroups.com

I would be uploading individual company analysis in the future too.

A rejected idea – tube investments

A

Tube investments is an idea which passed through my initial filter. I initiated the next step of analysing the company’s annual report. The analysis summary is below

Summary

The company has several businesses such as cycles, precision steel tubes and other tube products, chains, metal forming and financial services.
The company has had good return on capital of 20%+. It has a net margin of 5-6% . Its debt equity ratio has been between 0.4 to 0.6. The company has shown low growth with the topline increasing by 50% in the last 5 years. The net profit has tripled in that period (net of one time gain on investments)
The company has a net investment on the balance sheet of 500 Cr (net of debt). If I knock off the investment value of 28 Rs per share, then the valuation comes to around 5 PE based on the current market price. The stock seems to be a compelling buy.

Reason for rejection

On analysing the consolidated balance sheet, I discovered that the company has an additional debt of 500 Crs on its books due to a JV. The company has converted Cholamandalam investment and finance co. (CIFCL) into a JV with DBS bank. As a result the JV debts is now on the books. The company has however not provided any details further on this event. I think the event is important enough for the company to provide more details and give an assesment on the risks.

The above reason may seem small, but the debt and corresponding risk changes the profile of the company. The D/E ratio is now 1.3:1 and the company has not even provided enough details of the new JV. As a result I have decided to give the company a pass for the time being.


My Stock selection approach

M

I follow a simple approach to stock selection. The first step involves using a stock filter (see links in the side bar under useful links). I typically use a simple filter criteria of PE 10-12%, Debt to equity of less than 0.7 and a market cap of greater than 100 Cr.

In addition to the above source, I add to the initial list based on recommendations on other blogs, analyst reports etc.

The next stage involves doing a quick analysis of the company’s statements such as Profit and loss, balance sheet, financial ratios etc. I end up eliminating almost 70-80 % of the stocks in the original list. The reasons can range from low PE due to one time gains in the previous year (and normalized PE being high) to lack of transparency in the annual report.

I am fairly ruthless in eliminating companies at the above stage. If I am not comfortable with the economics of the business, or find that the level of disclosure is inadequate, I tend to give the stock a pass. I have ended up passing over stocks which have done well later, however I prefer the risk of omission than commission.

Once the numbers check out and I have the necessary AR and other documents, I initiate a deeper analysis. I have a detailed excel document and checklist which I use to analyse the company in terms of competitive position and competitive advantage etc. As a last step I do a 3 scenario DCF analysis ( optimistic, pessimistic and base case scenario) and a relative valuation exercise.

If at the end of the above exercise , the company checks out in terms of the qualitative analysis and the stock price is 60% of Intrinsic value, I initiate a buy on the stock. However I tend not to buy in one shot. I tend to buy in 5-6 orders spaced by a few weeks each. This allows any excitement or irrational attitude towards the stock to cool down. I also try to look at my notes again with a fresh mind and reanalyze my assumptions.

The above takes atleast 4-6 weeks of time. However the above analysis does not involve any peter lynch style study of the company’s products at stores or talking to customers or suppliers.

Rejected investment ideas

R

I generally run screens once a week and try to filter out companies with low PE ( 12). Using this list as a starting point, I generally do a quick analysis of the balance sheet, P&L account and the financial ratios.

Companies which check out, move into the ‘further analysis’ pile. The rest landup in two further piles. One pile consists of companies which are fundamentally weak and not worth investing at any price. The other pile is of companies which are good, but not at the right valuation. I park these companies in a separate list and review this list once in a while to check if the price is within my valuation target.

Going forward, I would posting on the rejected companies so that I can refer back to these companies, to analyse if I was incorrect in rejecting these companies in the first place.

One deep value idea which I am looking at is ‘cheviot company’ In addition the following companies are on my watch list

tube investments
India Nippon Electricals
teledata infomatics
revathi CP
novartis
MRO-TEK
EID Parry (India) Ltd.
Investment and Precision Casting
Mothersons
rane(madras)

I would be posting an analysis of the above companies on my blog soon.

Indraprastha Gas

I

Indraprastha gas ltd (IGL) is currently the sole provider of CNG and PNG in the NCR region. IGL was promoted by GAIL and BPCL ltd in 1998. It currently operates 146 CNG stations in the NCR region. In addition the company is setting up PNG infrastructure to supply Natural gas to commercial and residential consumers.

As per the Supreme Court directive all buses, commercial vehicles and Light good vehicles have to run on CNG. In addition there is a substantial cost advantage of running cars and 3 wheelers on CNG. As a result there is now a trend of private cars converting to CNG. These factors ensure a high level of demand stability for IGL and reasonable growth prospects due to continuing conversion of cars to CNG and due to growth in PNG consumers.

In addition IGL is now expanding into the adjacent areas of noida and ghaziabad. It is also doing a feasibility study in haryana.

IGL’s CNG sales is less than 50% of its compression capacity. As a result IGL has substantial operating leverage and would be able to grow revenues with low capital expenditure.

Competetive advantage
IGL is currently the sole provider of NG to the transportation sector and to commercial and residential consumers. The gas industry all over the world is characterised by local monopolies. Typically there is a single company supplying gas to the final consumers, as it is not viable to have two competing pipelines in a given geographic area. As a result IGL would likely remain a monopoly in the NCR region. In addition GAIL which can be a strong competitor is actually a promoter of the company.
The company is one of those rare cases where there is a substantial monopoly and a government/ court mandated requirement of its product. This gives the company a substantial visibility of demand.

Financials
The company has had a ROC of 25%+ since inception. In addition like other gas companies it has a very low working capital requirement. The NPM margins at 19% are twice that of other gas companies such as gujarat gas. Also the company has zero debt and a small amount of cash on the balance sheet which will grow due to strong free cash flows. The main investment of the company is mainly fixed assets which is mainly the gas infrastructure.

Valuation
The company has an EPS of around 9.5 and the FCF (free cash flow) is around the same amount. As a result at the current price it sells at around 11-12 times free cash flow. A company with such strong competitive advantage, high ROC and good growth prospects of 8-9 % per annum , can conservatively be valued at 16-18 times PE. As a result the company is selling at 30-35% discount of conservatively calculated intrinsic value

Risk
The key risk for the company is the supply risk. IGL gets 50% of gas at APM rates. On checking I found that the APM price for gas are around 40-50% lower than market rates. As the government plans to bring market based pricing for gas in due course of time, the gas cost for IGL would increase in the next few years. The net margins for the company, which are at 20%, would reduce when this happens if the company is not able to pass the complete increase to the consumer.

Additional points
The current price seems to discount the above scenario. I personally feel that IGL would be able to pass some of the price increase, although there would definitely be some impact to the net margins. This would not necessarily impact the absolute profits, but could result in slow down of the growth in net profits.
Assuming that 3-5 years later IGL starts paying market price as per govt policy, the gross and net margins will drop for IGL. Taking GGCL NPM of 11% as the base line ,IGL can have a NPM of 13-14 % due to better retail mix and higher pricing strength. Also some amount of cushioning will happen as volumes increase.

Comparitive valuation
In comparison with guj gas, IGL has higher margins and better ROC. Also IGL is 20% cheaper than Guj gas. Against a NP of 90Cr for Guj gas, IGL will have rough profit of 130 Cr. Also mcap for both companies is same. By comparitive valuation IGL should be valued same as Guj gas , if not more.

Great article on valuing a cyclical company

G

Found the following link on the motely fool board about USG. USG – united states gypsum, is a construction material company, manufacturing wallboards (gypsum boards) and other construction material such as tiles. The performance of this company is highly dependent on the state of the US housing market.

http://www.texashedge.com/THR021507.pdf

I would highly recommend this article to anyone interested in learing how to value and invest in cyclical companies. added note : Warren buffett holds 19% of this company’s equity.

Risk of high stock valuation

R

Most of us know that a stock with a high valuation has a higher risk of loss if the company dissapoints in terms of earnings. However i think there is an additional factor to consider when investing in a stock which is fully valued. A stock which is fairly valued has already discounted a bright future. When i think of investing in such a stock, my due diligence has to be deeper. I should have a strong reason to believe that the company has an even brighter future than what the market believe. What that means is that i am looking into the future farther for the company

Let me illustrate –

Company A sells at 12 times PE. If the ROE is around 15%, then the stock is discounting a mere 3 years of growth of 10 %.

In contrast company B sells at 30 times PE. If the ROE is 15%, then the stock is already discounting a growth of 15% for 10 years.

For me to make money on stock B, i need to have the foresight that the company do better than what the market has discounted. That means the company has to grow faster than 15% or for longer. Both cases for stock B are not easy to forecast .

In contrast company A has to perform only a bit better to give me good returns.

Now all of the above is basic value investing and concept of margin of safety. however my thought is that for high PE stock i should have a deep understanding of the business , its competitive position and other factors. Also my margin of error is smaller for such stocks. If an unknown factor works against the company, then there could be a permanent loss of capital. In contrast low valuation stocks need only a few things to go right for me to come out ahead.

In a nutshell, a low valuation stock protects me from my own shortcomings and sometimes I can get away with lesser research.

Stocks in the real estate business, telecom and retail come to my mind when I think of fairly valued company. When I look at these companies, the thought which comes to my mind is whether these companies will do better than what the market expects and does my own research substantiate it?

Asset allocation

A

There are a lot of tools available for doing asset allocation of your portfolio. They vary from the simple (like 90- age should your equity %) to the highly complex which try to allocate assets based on age, risk profile, asset classes etc.

I have till date never used an asset allocation tool though. I don’t say this with any pride or due to some big insight. It is just that I am not comfortable with most of these mechanical tools.

Asset allocation according to me is a highly subjective process. My thought process has been a bit different on it. I don’t look at asset allocation just from the point of view of my investments alone. For me an allocation decision depends on some of the following factors

1. amount of money saved – I had a higher equity holding earlier when my asset base was small. However as time progressed my equity holding as % of assets have come down although the absolute number has gone up
stability of my day time job – there have been times when I have felt that my primary source of income has been at risk. At such times I have tried to reduce the risk to my portfolio by not increasing equity investments

2. opportunities – A lot of my asset allocation decisions are based on what seems undervalued. I tend to migrate my portfolio in that direction at that time. For ex : 2002-2003 was a time for me to increase my equity holding. 2003-2004 was the time for me to move into real estate (which was based more on need than any timing). 2004-2005 was the time for me to go long on debt and into floating rate funds. 2005 and onwards I have not done much, expected liquidate a bit and just read.

3. Experience or learning – I tend to invest in only those asset classes where I feel I have some understanding and a bit of an edge. As a result I have never dabbled in options, metals etc

4. Whims and fancy – I would like to think I am rational, but I guess I am more risk averse than an average investor. As a result my investments are smaller than what a mathematical formuale (such as kelly’s formulae) would suggest. In addition, I have an aversion to IPO’s (more in a later post), gold and in ,general commodity business.

5. Sleep test – this would seem to be the most irrational factor, but it is a very important one for me. It works this way – With the current asset allocation , can I sleep well in night if a particular asset drops by 20-30 %. I have at time liquidated assets that don’t meet this criteria.

As a result of all these factors my average equity holding fluctuates between 30-50 %, real estate 20-30% and the rest in debt holding. Not a very optimal approach, but it gives me my targeted rate of return and lets me sleep well !!

Thoughts on inflation and interest rates

T

The RBI has just raised the CRR by another .5 %. This with inflation at 6.5%, although I feel this inflation is understated as the government’s basket of goods really not reflect an average middle class’s consumption profile. Rentals, education and health care alone are inflating in double digits.

I have never had any specific views on interest rates or inflation. I try not to base my investment plans on any predictions of inflation or interest rates. However that does not mean I don’t to react to it. In the past I have taken the following actions

In 2000-2001, I invested in fixed income debt funds. As the rates fell, the appreciation in these funds was substantial.

In 2003 when the interest rates were at an all time low, I moved my fixed income investments into floating rate funds and went long on by housing debt (see my thoughts on it here)

With rates hovering in 9-10 %, I have started looking at the option of moving out of floating rate funds into fixed income debt funds of average maturity (4-6 years duration). I have not made up my mind yet on it. I may wait for a couple of months more as I feel that the interest rates may rise a bit further. I am not sure about it and do not have specific views on it, but would wait and watch and react opportunistically to it.

As far as the stock market is concerned, I have been finding a few interesting opportunities such as indraprastha gas which I will explore further in a future post.

Additional comments – 15-Feb

Found this article on GEF (morgan stanley ‘s global economic forum)

http://www.morganstanley.com/views/gef/archive/2007/20070214-Wed.html#anchor4403

Following comments are worth noting

Excess liquidity conditions in late 2003 and 2004 resulted in banks searching for yield and charging negligible risk premiums for loan assets with inherently higher risks. Just about 12 months ago, banks were making little distinction between pricing credit risk for various types of loan assets. Almost all loans were being priced in a very narrow range of around 7.5-8%, which was very similar to the 10-year bond yields then. Indeed, banks’ lending behavior implied that the risk of lending to a low-income-bracket borrower (for whom there is little credit history available) for the purchase of a two-wheeler was not meaningfully different from the risk of investing in government bonds.

If the past two months’ average credit growth of 30% and deposit growth of 22.5% are maintained, the banking sector SLR ratio will reach its maximum limit of 25% by March 2007.

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